The argument
We do not merely use logic. We appeal to it as an authority.
When someone makes a contradictory argument, we do not simply observe that they think differently. We identify a defect in their reasoning.
When a conclusion does not follow from its premises, we do not regard it as an equally acceptable alternative. We regard the inference as invalid.
Why?
If logic merely describes how human beings happen to think, then an illogical argument is simply another instance of human thought. It may be unusual, unpopular, or psychologically inconvenient, but why should it be considered wrong?
Yet this is precisely how we treat failures of reasoning.
We distinguish between how people do think and how they ought to think.
A person may sincerely believe that a conclusion follows from certain premises. Their sincerity does not make the inference valid.
An entire society may accept an invalid argument. Its popularity does not establish its validity.
Logical correctness is not determined by agreement.
Nor is it established by the mere fact that a particular brain produces a particular thought.
The fact that we think something does not establish that we are justified in thinking it.
Logic therefore serves a function beyond describing our mental activity. It provides standards against which reasoning can be evaluated.
This raises a further question: What accounts for the authority of those standards?
Syllogism
If logical principles were merely descriptions of how people happen to think, they would not, by themselves, establish standards by which thinking can be judged correct or incorrect.
Logical principles function as standards by which reasoning can be judged correct or incorrect.
Therefore, logical principles cannot be adequately understood as merely descriptions of how people happen to think.
Rebuttal
One may object that logic is a human invention, like the rules of chess.
Chess has rules that determine whether a move is legal, yet those rules do not exist independently of human beings. Why should logic be any different?
The distinction lies in the scope of their authority.
The rules of chess govern chess because we have agreed to play that game. We can abandon chess without abandoning rational inquiry.
But logical standards govern the very arguments by which we defend or reject conventions, including the rules of chess.
We cannot justify abandoning all logical standards without employing some standard of reasoning in the justification.
A more substantial objection is that logical principles are constitutive rules of rational thought. They need not exist as independent entities to possess authority. Their authority follows from what it means to reason.
This is a serious alternative.
But it does not reduce logic to a description of psychological behavior. It acknowledges that reasoning is subject to standards that distinguish correct inference from incorrect inference.
The question of their ultimate foundation remains open.
We have established that logic is not merely something we do. It is something by which our reasoning can be judged.
What we have not yet established is whether that authority is grounded in abstract logical relations, the nature of rational agency, the structure of reality, or something more fundamental.
Those explanations must be examined rather than assumed.
Sources
- Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Book I, chapter 1 — Deduction and the relation between premises and conclusions.
- Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, chapters 3–4 — The principle of noncontradiction.
- Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, Introduction — The distinction between logical and psychological accounts of thought.
- Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume I, Prolegomena to Pure Logic — Critique of psychologism and the objectivity of logical laws.
- Gilbert Harman, Change in View — The relationship between logic, inference, and the revision of beliefs.