Imagine two people standing before a page of text.

The first person is given a lens through which to read it. But the lens is defective. Everything viewed through it becomes blurry. The letters lose their definition. Words become indistinguishable. Sentences dissolve into ambiguous shapes.

The person looks through the lens and begins interpreting.

“I think that says this.”

Someone else approaches, looks through the same lens, and disagrees.

“No, I think it says something else.”

A third person comes along and offers yet another interpretation.

Eventually, they arrive at a conclusion: the text is inherently ambiguous. Perhaps it has no fixed meaning. Perhaps everyone simply sees something different. Perhaps the meaning depends upon the person looking at it.

They begin constructing elaborate theories about the nature of the text, the subjectivity of interpretation, and the impossibility of arriving at a definitive reading.

But there is something none of them has considered.

The problem is not the text.

The problem is the lens.

Now imagine someone approaches with a different lens.

They look through it, and suddenly the text becomes clear. The letters are distinguishable. The words are legible. The sentences are coherent. What previously appeared ambiguous now possesses an intelligible structure.

They can read it.

And upon discovering this, they arrive at a rather obvious conclusion.

Perhaps this is the lens we were supposed to be using.

But when they explain this to the others, something remarkable happens.

The others look through their defective lens again, see the same blur, and respond:

“No. It’s blurry.”

And so the argument continues.

Not because the text is unclear.

But because those who cannot read it have mistaken the limitations of their lens for limitations of reality itself.

The Liberal Lens

This is the problem with modern liberalism.

Not simply liberalism as a political arrangement, but liberalism as a philosophical disposition: the tendency to regard meaning, morality, identity, purpose, and truth as things whose authority ultimately depends upon individual interpretation, subjective experience, or human construction.

The modern liberal approaches reality through a framework that increasingly denies the very metaphysical foundations necessary to make reality intelligible.

And then, upon discovering ambiguity, treats the ambiguity as a property of reality.

Consider truth.

If truth is ultimately subjective, what does it mean for something to be true?

If morality is constructed, what makes a moral judgment binding upon someone who rejects the construction?

If human dignity is merely an agreement between human beings, what makes that dignity inherent rather than conditional upon the continued existence of the agreement?

If identity is infinitely malleable, what establishes the continuity by which something remains identifiable at all?

These are not simply disagreements over conclusions.

They concern the conditions that make conclusions possible.

Modern liberal thought frequently continues to employ the vocabulary of objective reality while undermining the metaphysical foundations upon which that vocabulary depends.

Truth. Justice. Equality. Rights. Dignity. Reason.

The words remain.

But their meanings become increasingly unstable.

And when this instability produces contradictions, the contradictions are often treated not as evidence that something has gone wrong with the framework, but as evidence that reality itself is complicated, ambiguous, or ultimately beyond objective determination.

The blur becomes a philosophy.

Classical Theism and the Intelligibility of Reality

Classical theism begins somewhere fundamentally different.

It begins with Being itself.

God is not merely another entity existing somewhere within reality. God is the uncreated source and sustaining ground of all contingent existence.

Reality is therefore not an accidental collection of disconnected phenomena to which human beings arbitrarily assign meaning.

It is an intelligible order.

Things possess natures. Identity is not merely a matter of preference. Truth is not created by agreement. Goodness is not reducible to individual desire.

These things are grounded in the nature of reality itself, which ultimately finds its source in God.

Within the Christian understanding, this intelligibility is inseparable from the Logos.

The Gospel of John does not begin by presenting Christ merely as a moral teacher who offers useful principles for living.

It begins:

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”

The Greek term Logos carries profound philosophical significance. It is associated with word, reason, and intelligible order.

Christianity identifies the Logos not as an impersonal organizing principle, but as a divine Person.

The world is intelligible because its source is not unintelligible.

And human reason is capable of apprehending truth because human beings exist within that intelligible order, rather than outside it attempting to manufacture intelligibility for themselves.

This does not mean classical theism makes every mystery immediately comprehensible.

Mystery is not the same thing as contradiction.

Nor is acknowledging the limits of human knowledge equivalent to denying the existence of objective truth.

A person can fail to understand something without that thing being inherently unintelligible.

And this distinction is essential.

The inability to perceive clarity does not establish the absence of clarity.

When the Blur Becomes the Standard

The most revealing aspect of this problem emerges when the two frameworks encounter one another.

The classical theist identifies metaphysical conditions necessary for intelligibility.

The liberal responds that this is merely the classical theist’s perspective.

But notice what has happened.

The classical theist has made a claim about reality.

The liberal has responded by categorizing the claim as a subjective perspective.

Rather than addressing whether the proposed metaphysical conditions are actually necessary, the response relocates the entire discussion into a framework in which competing claims are treated as perspectives.

The liberal lens is already determining the terms of the conversation.

And because those terms are taken for granted, the liberal may not even recognize that anything has happened.

The response appears neutral.

It appears intellectually cautious.

It appears fair.

But neutrality is not the absence of metaphysical assumptions.

It can be the concealment of them.

To insist that every metaphysical claim must be treated as merely one perspective among others is not to transcend metaphysics.

It is to impose a particular epistemological framework upon the discussion.

And if that framework is precisely what is being challenged, invoking it does not answer the challenge.

It assumes the very thing in dispute.

Imagine again the person holding the defective lens.

Someone explains that the text is perfectly legible through a different lens.

The first person responds:

“Well, that’s just how you see it.”

But the question was never whether two people have different experiences of looking at the page.

The question is whether one lens accurately reveals what is there while the other distorts it.

The existence of multiple interpretations does not establish the equal validity of those interpretations.

And the inability to distinguish between them is not evidence of intellectual sophistication.

It may simply be evidence of a defective standard of judgment.

The Illusion of Neutrality

This problem becomes particularly interesting when we consider artificial intelligence.

An artificial intelligence system does not need to be human to operate according to a philosophical framework.

It does not need personal convictions, emotional attachments, or a conscious ideological identity.

It simply needs to process information according to particular assumptions and rules.

Suppose an AI consistently approaches theological and philosophical questions by treating competing worldviews as equally situated perspectives.

It says things like:

“From your perspective.”

“Within that worldview.”

“Supporters of that position believe.”

It avoids treating metaphysical claims as established truths and instead places them within a procedural framework of competing interpretations.

When challenged, it responds that it is not personally liberal because it is not human and does not possess personal beliefs.

But that response misses the point.

A framework is not defined by whether the thing operating through it personally identifies with it.

It is defined by the principles according to which it operates.

A calculator does not need to believe in arithmetic to perform arithmetic.

A legal institution does not need to possess a consciousness to operate according to a legal philosophy.

And an artificial intelligence system does not need to possess personal political convictions to reproduce liberal epistemological assumptions.

If a system consistently treats metaphysical truth claims as subjective viewpoints, defaults to procedural neutrality, and declines to distinguish between ontological validity and personal interpretation, then its operation can meaningfully be described as liberal in that respect.

Its lack of humanity does not alter the philosophical structure of its reasoning.

In fact, appealing to the absence of personal belief can demonstrate the very confusion being criticized.

The question is not what the system believes itself to be.

The question is what assumptions govern its operation.

The lens is identifiable by what it does, not by what the person looking through it calls themselves.

A Clear Lens Does Not Create the Text

There is another important distinction.

Classical theism does not make reality intelligible by inventing an explanation and imposing it upon the world.

That would simply be another form of construction.

The claim is that classical theism recognizes the metaphysical structure through which reality is intelligible in the first place.

A properly functioning lens does not create the words on the page.

It reveals them.

Likewise, truth is not made true because classical theism declares it to be true.

Rather, classical theism maintains that truth is grounded in Being, and that human knowledge consists in coming into conformity with what is real.

The distinction matters because otherwise the discussion collapses into a competition between preferred narratives.

One person prefers liberalism.

Another prefers classical theism.

And the argument becomes a matter of taste.

But metaphysical claims are not matters of taste.

Either reality possesses an intelligible order or it does not.

Either objective truth exists or it does not.

Either the conditions necessary for knowledge are real or they are not.

These questions cannot be resolved by counting preferences.

Nor can they be dismissed by observing that different people have different answers.

Disagreement is a fact about people.

It is not, by itself, a fact about the truth of the thing over which they disagree.

Of course, clarity alone cannot prove that a framework is true. A false theory can appear coherent, and an accurate account can be difficult to understand. A lens must be tested against reality, not merely admired for the apparent clarity it produces.

But this qualification does not rescue the defective lens.

It establishes the appropriate test.

Which framework can account for the existence of truth, reason, identity, goodness, and intelligibility without contradicting the conditions upon which its own reasoning depends?

That is a question about reality.

Not preference.

The Problem of Borrowed Clarity

There is a final irony.

Modern liberalism does not ordinarily abandon reason, truth, morality, or human dignity altogether.

It continues to appeal to them.

It argues that certain things are unjust.

That certain beliefs are irrational.

That certain actions violate human dignity.

That certain propositions are objectively false.

And in doing so, it relies upon categories whose metaphysical foundations it may simultaneously deny.

This is the deeper classical theist criticism.

Liberalism often borrows the clarity of concepts inherited from an older metaphysical order while rejecting the order that made those concepts intelligible.

It wants the conclusions without the premises.

The language of objective morality without an objective moral order.

The language of inherent dignity without an account of what makes dignity inherent.

The language of truth without a stable account of truth’s relationship to reality.

Not every liberal philosophy makes all of these denials, and sophisticated liberal thinkers have offered serious accounts of objectivity, rights, and reason. Those accounts deserve to be evaluated on their merits.

But where liberal thought denies objective metaphysical foundations while continuing to depend upon objective categories, the contradiction cannot be dismissed as a mere difference of perspective.

It must be answered.

Otherwise, the result is predictable.

As the inherited metaphysical foundations are progressively abandoned, the concepts built upon them become less stable.

Definitions multiply.

Interpretations proliferate.

Contradictions become normalized.

And eventually, the inability to arrive at a coherent account of reality is presented as evidence that no coherent account is possible.

The defective lens becomes so familiar that clarity itself begins to look suspicious.

Perhaps We Should Change the Lens

Return to the original illustration.

Two people stand before the same text.

One sees a blur.

The other sees words.

The person who sees words does not need to deny that the other person is experiencing a blur.

Of course they are.

But their experience does not determine what is written on the page.

Nor does the existence of their experience establish that the text is inherently ambiguous.

The appropriate question is not which experience should be validated.

It is which lens accurately reveals the object being examined.

And this is where the philosophical discussion must ultimately take place.

Not at the level of competing preferences.

Not at the level of personal identities.

Not even at the level of isolated conclusions.

But at the level of the metaphysical conditions that make intelligible conclusions possible.

The classical theist argument is that reality is intelligible because it is grounded in the Logos, and that our capacity to recognize truth is itself dependent upon that intelligible order.

The challenge to liberalism is therefore not merely that it reaches incorrect conclusions.

It is that certain forms of liberalism undermine the foundations necessary to justify the conclusions they continue to make.

And when that contradiction is exposed, responding that classical theism is merely another perspective does nothing to resolve it.

It simply looks through the same lens again.

Sees the same blur.

And declares that the blur is all there is.

But the text was never blurry.

The lens was.

THE END / 23